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Abstract
I study decision-making in healthcare choices and competitions. In my analysis,
I use both quasi-experimental and experimental methods. In the first chapter, I
investigate the effects of C-sections on babies and their mothers. Using administrative
data from South Carolina, I exploit the breech position to isolate variation in C-
sections that is uncorrelated with the ex-ante health of the infant and mother. I
find that a C-section increases the probability of abnormal conditions for babies
immediately after birth. However, there are no significant effects on babies’ future
health conditions after birth. Mothers who deliver by C-section are more likely to
develop complications in puerperium after birth in those marginal cases where the
baby randomly stays upside-down. Mothers who deliver by C-section are more likely to
develop complications in puerperium after birth, however, there is suggestive evidence
that C-sections might be good for post-partum mental health. This research also
documents that C-sections increase the length of hospital stays and lead to reductions
in future fertility.
In the second chapter, my coauthor and I investigate how individuals behave and
interact with each other in contests with entry fees in an experimental laboratory. We
find overspending for all entry fees; under - participation for low entry fees; over -
participation for medium and high entry fees; and the optimal entry fee for the contest
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Chapter 1
The Effects of Cesarean Sections on Mothers
and Babies
1.1 Introduction
Cesarean section (C-section), a surgical procedure to deliver babies, is the most
common major operation performed in many industrialized countries. In the US, there
are more than one million C-section surgeries each year (Jauniaux and Grobman 2016).
C-sections can save women’s and babies’ lives when certain complications occur during
pregnancy or birth (The Lancet 2018), yet, the wide variation in C-section rates across
countries points to an absence of agreement about the best way of delivering babies.
The World Health Organization (WHO) recommends that the rate of C-sections
should not exceed 10 to 15 percent, but only 14 countries are in this rate (Gibbons
et al. 2010)1 Given the importance of accurate policy recommendations and the high
share of children born via C-section, it is important to understand the economic
consequences and health impacts of C-sections on delivering mothers and infants.
C-section is major surgery and recovery usually takes more time than vaginal birth.
These operations are done in situations when the baby needs to be removed immediately
at birth (emergency) or other times they could have been planned (elective) in advance.
Emergency c-sections are usually employed when there are health concerns related to
the mother and/or baby. Planned c-sections can be done for several reasons, including
1A total of 54 countries had C-section rates under 10%, whereas 69 countries had
rates more than 15%.
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having a previous c-section, or even just due to personal reasons to pick the delivery
date. Therefore, c-sections are correlated with several factors including babies’ and
mothers’ health, mother’s choices, and other characteristics.
Women who undergo a C-section usually stay at the hospital around two to four
days after birth, whereas the hospital stay for a vaginal birth is typically one to two
days aurora. Moreover, having a baby via a C-section is usually more expensive
than having natural birth. In 2010, the average US cost for women for prenatal,
intrapartum, and postpartum care after a C-section was around $10,000 more and
newborn care was around $6,000 more than vaginal birth for babies (Truven Health
Analytics 2013). In addition, it has been claimed that C-sections are associated with
long-term women’s health problems. Women who have C-sections, are more likely to
have postpartum complications (Koroukian 2004) and postpartum depression (Tonei
2019). Also, there are mixed findings regarding the effects on children’s health. Some
studies show that newborns delivered by C-section are more likely to develop obesity,
asthma, and type 1 diabetes (Blustein and Liu 2015), and an increased risk of disease
associated with immune function (Kristensen and Henriksen 2016) when they get
older. Some other studies show no association between C-sections and long-term type
1 diabetes, obesity, or atopic disease diagnosis (Costa-Ramón et al. 2020).2
This paper investigates the causal effect of C-sections on babies’ and mothers’
health, health utilization, and hospital costs. In particular, I study babies’ neonatal
health and health outcomes within one year after birth; and mothers’ mental and
physical health outcomes within one year after birth, and future fertility. I also
study hospital costs and hospital utilization effects of C-sections. Providing credible,
casual answers to these questions is not straightforward, not only because it requires
detailed data but also the endogeneity concerns in the delivery mode. C-sections are
2Costa-Ramón et al. 2020 finds that C-sections increase the probability of having
asthma.
2
endogenous to mothers’ and babies’ ex-ante health conditions and other characteristics.
Even though the models control for many of the characteristics (such as mothers’ age,
weight, some of the pre-health conditions, baby’s health at birth), there might be
unobservable elements that can affect the choice of delivery, such as unobservable
health conditions of mothers and babies, or issues at pregnancy and delivery.
In order to overcome these challenges, I utilize rich administrative data from South
Carolina that links birth certificates to mothers’ and infants’ hospital records. I then
exploit variations in the position of the fetus as an instrument for C-section. Having
the baby in a breech position is a random reason when a C-section is requested. Breech
position is a situation when the fetus presents buttocks or feet first (rather than head
first – a cephalic presentation)(American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
2020), and the reasons why at term babies’ (37–40 weeks gestational age) are at the
breech position are generally unknown. I first show that breech position at delivery
is independent of mothers’ and babies’ predetermined characteristics. I then show
that the probability of C-section increases substantially if the position of the fetus is
breech at the time of the delivery.3
This study identifies effects of C-sections on women who would have had a vaginal
delivery if only their baby had been the other way around, and on their babies.
The health results for these marginal mothers are mixed. C-sections lead to more
complications in the post-partum period. On the other hand, there is evidence that
C-sections might be beneficial for women’s mental health. Controlling for time and
hospital fixed effects, I find a 2.3 percentage point increase in the probability of being
diagnosed with a complication of the puerperium within one year of the first birth.
Regarding mental health, I find a 0.5 percentage point reduction in the probability of
being diagnosed with postpartum depression within one year of the first birth. For
3This is not the first study that use breech position as an instrument for C-section.
Tonei 2019 utilized this exogenous variation in the position to study the effects of
C-section on mothers’ mental health.
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all births, I find a 0.9 unit percentage point reduction. These findings show results
of when primary diagnoses are utilized to define postpartum depression. However,
primary diagnoses are important to consider because they constitute the root cause
of the visit and refers to the most serious and/or resource-intensive condition when
a person was hospitalized (Clements 2019). However, the mental health results are
not significant once secondary diagnoses were also taken care of. These findings are
different from Tonei 2019’s study, which finds that women report more sadness lasting
two weeks or more after an unplanned C-section. In addition to these, I find that
C-sections reduce the fertility rates for women. A C-section reduces number of births
by 0.135 on average, reduces the likelihood of having one more baby after the first
baby by 2.9 percentage point, and increases the gap between first and second birth by
almost 3 months.
I find that babies who were quasi-randomly delivered via C-sections are more likely
to have any abnormal conditions at birth. In particular, I find that, the probability
of having any abnormal conditions at birth increases by 2.6 percent. However, these
adverse effects at birth do not translate into a higher probability of early childhood
health conditions such as obesity, immunity-related disorders, asthma, and respiratory-
related disorders.
In terms of health utilization, I find that C-sections increase the total length of stay
for women by 0.083 days, and for babies, it increases by 0.2 days. The total hospital
charges increase by 30 percent for mothers, and 28.5 percent for babies. Although not
significant, the total number of hospital visits for both mothers and children increase.
There are a number of recent papers in health economics on C-sections (Jensen
and Wüst 2015; Mühlrad 2020; Costa-Ramón et al. 2018; Tonei 2019; Costa-Ramón
et al. 2020). All of these studies use data from the EU countries, and their findings
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are mixed.4 These papers tend to focus on the effect of delivery method on either
children’s or mothers’ outcomes. Two studies attempt to analyze the effect of C-section
for high-risk babies on both children and women’s later-life effects. Jensen and Wüst
2015 find that a C-section reduces the baby’s probability of having a low APGAR
score and the number of family doctor visits within one year after they are born,
and does not impact severe neonatal morbidity or hospitalizations. They find that
the costs and hospitalizations for women increased, however, there is no maternal
post-birth complications or infections for mothers. Mühlrad 2020, find similar results
for babies and find no impact on women’s health at birth or subsequent births. Instead
of focusing either on babies or on mothers’ health outcomes in short or long-term as
in the previous studies, this paper investigates the effect on both. Therefore, this
paper attempts to be the most comprehensive study in this area. It is also the first
study that investigates this subject in the USA - which is the world’s most expensive
country for childbirth (Hargraves and Bloschichak 2019) and has the highest maternal
mortality rate among developed countries (Tikkanen et al. 2018).
There is a continuing debate regarding the use of C-sections for breech presentation
(MacFarlane et al. 2016). C-sections have spread remarkably fast in recent years.
Especially after the multi-country Term Breech Trial in 2000, breech babies have
higher probability of being delivered by C-sections. However, according to my findings,
because of the possible post partum complications, women should be provided regular
follow-up services at least 1 year after giving birth via C-section. If these considerations
would be taken care of, then giving a birth via C-section could be beneficial for these
marginal women’s mental health. Breech births at terms constitutes a 3-4% of all
births, this means this study applies to 15,400 women and babies each day. Even
if this study analytically relates to breech births, it brings useful conclusion for the
4Card, Fenizia, and Silver 2019 investigates the health impacts of hospital practices
in California, and find that hospital delivery practices at high C-section hospitals have
important health benefits for newborns.
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implications of C-sections. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section
1.2 summarises previous literature on this topic. Section 1.3 presents the empirical
strategies and data are described in Section 1.4. Section 1.5 shows the main results.
Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
The global growth of C-sections has attracted the attention of researchers to this
topic. The first studies in the economics literature study the non-medical reasons
for the increase in these operations. Some studies show financial incentives as a
major explanation for this. Gruber and Owings 1996 find that a 10 percent fertility
decline in the US leads to a 0.6 percentage rise in the likelihood of having a C-section,
suggesting that obstetrician-gynecologist may substitute patients’ demand for highly
reimbursed C-sections over natural births. Gruber, Kim, and Mayzlin 1999 find
C-sections increased in response to an increase in the difference in fee differentials
between C-section and vaginal birth for the Medicaid program.
However, it is important to understand the health effects of this procedure to assess
the cost efficiency. Recent studies consider this and started to investigate the health
effects of C-section. Currie and MacLeod 2008 find that reforms of joint and several
liability reduce induction and stimulation of labor, C-sections, and complications of
labor and delivery, while caps on non-economic damages increase them. However, they
show that, this increase in procedure use and effort level does not correspond with
improved infant health at birth measured as the APGAR score. Jensen and Wüst 2015
and Mühlrad 2020, study the impact of C-sections on the health of babies that are in
a breech position at term and their mothers. Jensen and Wüst 2015, using Danish
data, find that C-section reduce the likelihood of having low APGAR scores and the
number of family doctor visits in the first year of life. They also find that mothers’
post-birth hospitalizations increase in length, but C-sections are not associated with
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maternal post-birth complications or infections. Mühlrad 2020 exploits a sharp policy
change in Sweden that led to a large increase in planned C-sections for breech births,
and finds improvements in infant health at birth (measured in low APGAR score) and
long term health (measured in number of hospitalizations) but no significant effect
on mothers’ health at birth, future fertility or labor market outcomes (measured as
annual income from gainful employment, parental benefits, and sickness benefits).
Halla et al. 2020 show an increase in C-section rates on days that precede a leisure
day and exploit this variation in an instrumental variable framework. They document
that having a C-section is associated with a reduction in fertility. Costa-Ramón et al.
2020 use the same methodology and find that unplanned C-sections in Finland are
associated with low APGAR score, being admitted to the intensive care unit and
receiving assisted ventilation for newborns. They also find that being born by an
unplanned C-section increases the probability of having asthma, but does not have
impact on probability of having asthma, obesity, type 1 diabetes, and atopic diseases.
Another study using the UK Millennium Cohort Study investigates the impact on
mother’s mental health, using the position of fetus as an instrument for C-section,
and finds that the women report more sadness lasting two weeks or more after having
a childbirth via a unplanned C-section for a high-risk baby (Tonei 2019).
The previous papers either focused on baby or just on mother’s health, or only
focused on health or economic consequences, or only focused on mothers’ mental
health after birth. Mühlrad 2020 gives a broad set of results, but does not provide
information on hospital costs, long run health effects of babies (except hospitalizations),
and mothers’ mental health. Jensen and Wüst 2015 show results for the hospital costs
but do not provide detailed long run health results for babies and mothers other than
hospitalizations or maternal health at future deliveries. Halla et al. 2020 only focus on
future fertility, Costa-Ramón et al. 2020 only takes into account babies’ outcomes, and
(Tonei 2019) only explores mothers’ mental health after birth. This study aims to be
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the most comprehensive study that explores both health and economic consequences
of C-sections. In particular, I investigate babies and mothers’ health at delivery, later
life health (including mothers’ mental health), hospitalizations, and hospital costs.
Moreover, all above-mentioned studies use data from the EU countries. However,
the delivery effects in the USA is important to be explored because the USA is the
most expensive country for baby birth,5 and maternal and infant mortality is higher
than many other developed countries (America’s Health Rankings 2018). This study
uses data from the South Carolina to investigate the effects of C-sections in the USA.
More than 31% of all deliveries in the USA were by C-section in 2018 (CDC 2020).
In South Carolina, the rates are similar (see Figure 1.1). The only existing health
economics study in the USA is Card, Fenizia, and Silver 2019. Card, Fenizia, and
Silver 2019 study the health impacts of delivery at hospitals with higher versus lower
C-section rates. They find that infants birth at delivery improved when they were
delivered at hospitals with higher C-section rates, and are less likely to be readmitted
to the hospital.
1.3 Empirical Model
I study the economic and health effects of C-sections on mothers and their babies.
Because the type of delivery is likely to be associated with pre-delivery characteristics
of mothers and their babies, simple OLS estimation of C-sections on the mothers’
and babies’ outcomes are likely to be biased. To overcome this, I implement an
instrumental variables framework where I use the breech position as an instrument
for the C-section. I also complement my results with hospital and birth month/year
fixed effects.
5This is also true for South Carolina, where average total hospital charges within
one month after delivery are 6,600 USD for C-sections than vaginal births for women,
and 1,532 USD higher for babies (Figure 1.2)
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My econometric framework consists of linear models for C-section of mother (and
C-section of baby) i (CSi) and outcomes for the mother (and baby) (Yi):
The structural equation:
Yi = β0 + β1CSi + β2X ′i + tmy + hi + υi (1.1)
The first stage model for C-section delivery:
CSi = α0 + α1Breechi + α2X ′i + tmy + hi + vi (1.2)
The reduced form model for the effect of having breech position on outcomes:
Yi = δ0 + δ1Breechi + δ2X ′i + tmy + hi + ξi (1.3)
where CSi = 1 if the baby was born via C-section, Breechi = 1 if the position of the
fetus is Breech, X ′i vector of individual controls, tmy, are month and year of birth
fixed effects and hi are hospital fixed effects. The individual controls include mother’s
demographic characteristics (age, race, ethnicity, education level), characteristics of
the pregnancy (prenatal care level, baby’s weight, mother’s weight at birth, gestational
age, payment method and WIC participation), pregnancy and pre-pregnancy risk
factors (tobaco use during pregnancy, pre-pregnancy diabetes, gestational diabetes,
pre-pregnancy hypertension, pregnancy hypertension, previous preterm birth, previous
C-section birth) and a post-birth control (breastfeeding status).
In this setting, the covariate-adjusted IV estimator is equal to the ratio of the
reduced form coefficient on the breech position (δ1), to the first stage coefficient on the
probability of C-section (α1), scaling the reduced form effect per additional C-section.
Estimates of β1 in Equation 1.1 aim to estimate an average treatment effect (ATE).
Since the variation in the breech position only effects a subset of women, the ATE will
be for these women. This is known as local average treatment effect (LATE) (Angrist
and Imbens 1994). Therefore, LATE is the ATE for women who had C-section because
9
their baby was in breech position in the fetus, but would not had C-section if they
had a cephalic position. These group of women are known as the compliers (Angrist
and Pischke 2008).6 Considering breech presentation occurs about 3 to 4 out of every
100 full-term birth, which translates to around 130,000 term-babies in the USA, the
compliers are important group of individuals for policy making.
There are two assumptions that the instrument should satisfy. The first assumption
is, the breech position is associated with C-section. According to the American College
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, most fetuses that are breech are born via a planned
cesarean delivery (American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 2019). My
data also support this. Table 1.10 provides the first stage results using Breechi as an
exclusion restriction. Panel A shows results for the first births and Panel B shows the
results for all births. Model (1), Model (2), Model (3), and Model(4) show results
with no fixed effects, birth month-year fixed effects, hospital fixed effects and both
month-year and hospital fixed effects. Accordingly, the partial correlation between
the breech position and having a cesarean birth is equal to 0.658 (0.658, 0.660 and
0.661 when month-year birth date fixed effects, hospital fixed effects and both of the
fixed effects are included, respectively), and it is strongly significant. For all births,
the strong significance remain for all specifications (Panel B).
Additionally, the IV should meet monotonicity criteria, which implies that the
breech position should have either a positive or zero treatment effect, so that C-section
is more likely after the breech position but never less likely. Figure 1.3 shows the
positive correlation between Breech position and cesarean delivery. Figure 1.3a shows
results for first births and Figure 1.3b shows results for all births. The figures also show
that if the babies’ position is cephalic., i.e. ideal position (head-down) for childbirth,
6In the models for babies, the compliers would be the babies who were born via a
C-section because their position in the fetus were breech.
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then more than 70% of first births are vaginally delivered. The correlation between
breech position and C-section is positive and significant at one percent level.
The second assumption is the exclusion restriction, which means that instrument
can be excluded from the structural Equation 1.1, i.e. instrument is uncorrelated
with υi (Wooldridge 2010). That is, having a baby in a breech position at birth must
be uncorrelated with unobserved characteristics of the mother and her baby; breech
position should have no effect on their health and health utilization outcomes other
than through the first-stage channel.
The second assumption can not be tested, but I will provide some evidence that
this condition is mostly met. First, according to medical literature, in most of the
cases, there is no clear cause for why the baby is not positioned head-down (The
University of Michigan, Michigan Medicine Healthwise Staff 2019). In some cases
breech position may be associated with early labor, twins or more, problems with the
uterus, or problems with the baby (Cunningham et al. 2009). However, most often,
breech presentation is considered to be ‘simply an error of orientation’ (Enkin, Keirse,
and Neilson 1995). Second, the health economics literature supports the idea that
breech and non-breech mothers are similar in many characteristics (Jensen and Wüst
2015; Tonei 2019). For instance, Jensen and Wüst 2015 showing the percentages of
university degrees and pregnancy conditions unrelated to breech (e.g. pre-eclampsia
and diabetes) are similar for these 2 group of women, and they state that ‘...given
the observable characteristics at hand, breech pregnancies are as good as random’.
Similarly, Tonei 2019 show that most characteristics such as the baby’s health at birth
and the mother’s previous health conditions are not related to the position of the
womb.
In addition to previous research, I provide some evidence from my data to support
this assumption. First I regress all covariates on the breech position and esitmate
LPMs. Model (1) in Table 1.6 shows results when only first firths are considered,
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Model (2) shows results when all births are considered. According to Model (1), among
all education variables, only the indicator for having a masters degree is negatively
associated with having breech position. However, the magnitude is very small and
the effect goes away in Model (2). Regarding racial effects, being white increases the
probability of having the baby in breech position. Peterson 2010 also confirms this,
but, there is no clear evidence on why this is the case. One explanation might be
related to maternal age. In my data, the average maternal age for the first child is
21.6 for black women, and it is 24.7 for white women; and breech presentation might
be associated with older maternal ages (Cammu et al. 2014). Regarding prenatal care,
results show that women who has their baby in breech presentation have more prenatal
care. However, this finding is not surprising because women are often advised to see
doctors regularly when they are pregnant to breech babies, and some doctors may try
extra procedures like turning the baby in the mother’s uterus (Coco and Silverman
1998). Another result from the table is, women who use tobacco during pregnancy
are 0.004 (0.003) more likely to have breech baby in their first (all) birth. There are
some evidences from medical literature that breech position might be associated with
smoking (Amasha and Jaradeh 2014). My regressions control for this variable.
Second, I provide a balanced test in Table 1.7, which presents 2SLS etimates
obtained by adding gradually different sets of controls in the regression equation. This
table shows that the effect of C-section on the outcome is similar in all specifications,
and this can be helpful to support the exclusion restriction. Model (1) shows results
with no controls, Model (2) includes hospital fixed effects, Model (3) adds month-year
fixed effects, Model (4) includes mother’s demographic characteristics, Model (5) adds
covariates related to characteristics of the pregnancy, Model (6) adds mother’s health
risk factors, finally model (7) adds post-birth controls.
Third, I regress the breech position on all mothers’ and babies covariates. Table 1.8
show that, conditional on all other controls,the majority covariates are not associated
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with baby’s position for both of the first and all births; which supports the exclusion
restriction assumption. In the table, mother’s age, being eligible for the WIC Program,
birth weight, mothers’ age, baby weight, gestational age and mothers’ weight at
delivery and pre-pregnancy, tobacco use, gestational diabetes, and hypertension are
significant with having the fetus in breech position, although, the coefficients are
generally small. This means once I control for these variables, the breech position will
be exogenous in the regressions.
Fourth, Table 1.9 provides a balance test to compare the means of mothers’ and
babies’ characteristics by position of the fetus. The difference in means for most of
the variables are close to zero. Especially mothers’ ethnicity, pre-pregnancy weight,
and pre-pregnancy health risk factors do not differ in the two groups in the first
births, and differs slightly in all births. In line with the previous literature (Jensen
and Wüst 2015; Tonei 2019), I find that maternal age and education level increase
the likelihood of having a baby in breech position. Another difference occurs in some
of the payment source variables. Cephalic women have more Medicaid as a payment
method, whereas breech women tend to use private insurance as a payment method.
There is no difference in self payment or other sources of payment methods. Again,
the difference might be due to the age (and therefore education) differences. The
average age for women who use Medicaid is 23.2, whereas average age for women who
use private insurance is 28.7. I also find that women with a breech baby tend to less
participate to WIC. Although the difference is very small, most of the Kotelchuck
Index variables show that women who carry breech baby have more prenatal care then
cephalic babies. Also, there are differences in gestational age and baby weight. Finally,
there are very small differences in gestational risk factors, probability of breastfeeding
and whether or not using tobacco during pregnancy. Thus, once I control for these
variables, the findings points out that the breech position is random.
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1.4 Data
I use administrative data South Carolina, which comes from two sources: birth
certificates data from South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental
Control Vital Records and all-payer, uniform billing data for inpatient discharges from
the South Carolina Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Office.
All data records were pulled by the SC Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Office (RFA) as
of October 2020. The initial sample of birth certificates are characterized by 277,648
babies born between 2004 and 2018, from 139,336 first time mothers who delivered
their first (live) baby between 2004 and 2009 in South Carolina. Hospital records
report separately for these mothers and their babies.
Birth certificates include mothers’ and their babies’ encrypted identifiers. Hospital
records for mothers include mothers’ encrypted identifiers, whereas hospital records
for babies include babies’ encrypted identifiers. Using mothers’ identifiers I merge
birth certificates and hospital records for mothers. Each observation of this data is for
a mother (and her first baby). I refer this data as Mothers’ Data throughout the text.
Similarly, using babies’ identifiers, I merge birth certificates and hospital records for
babies. Each observation of data is for a baby (and his/her mother). I refer this data
as All Births Data.
1.4.1 Births Data
The South Carolina Vital Records offices provide birth certificates for births that
took place in SC since 1915. It includes information on mothers’ socio-economic
characteristics: age, education level,7 ethnicity (whether or not Hispanic), race (white,
7Whether or not the mother achieved 8th grade or less, whether or not achieved 9th-
12th grade with no diploma, whether or not high school graduate or GED completed,
whether or not some college credit with no degree, whether or not obtained associate
degree, whether or not obtained bachelor degree, whether or not obtained master
degree, and whether or not obtained doctorate or professional degree.
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black, or other), payment source (Medicaid, private insurance, self-pay or other),
whether or not participated in WIC, and county of residence. The vital statistics
also give detailed information on mothers’ health and health behavior during and
pre-pregnancy: mothers’ weight at delivery, mothers’ weight prior to the pregnancy,
whether or not mother used tobacco during pregnancy, whether or not infections
occurred during pregnancy,8 and her Kotelchuck index.9 The data include further
health related risk factors for mothers: whether or not the mother has gestational dia-
betes, gestational hypertension, pre-pregnancy diabetes, pre-pregnancy hypertension,
a history of a previous C-section and previous preterm birth. Information on previous
pregnancy outcomes is also captured: number of previous live births that are still alive,
number of previous live births that are now deceased and number of other pregnancy
outcomes. There are information on the fetal presentations as well: whether or not
breech, whether or not cephalic, whether or not other fetal presentation. There are
also information on final route of the delivery: whether or not cesarean and whether
or not vaginal.
The birth certificates contain detailed information on babies. First, the data
provide information on babies’ characteristics: birth month and year, gender, plurality
(the total number of births resulting from a single pregnancy), birth month and birth
year.10 Second, the data gives information on babies health: birth weight,11 gestational
8Presence of at least one of the following infections: Gonorrhea, Syphilis, Herpes,
and/or Chlamydia.
9This index shows the level of prenatal care. It is generated using two variables:
the time prenatal care began and the number of prenatal visits during pregnancy.
The Kotelchuck index has 4 categories: whether or not inadequate , whether or not
intermediate, whether or not adequate and whether or not adequate plus.
10The exact date of birth is restricted information.
11Using birth weight, I generate Extremely Low Birth Weight Very Low Birth
Weight, Low Birth Weight, Normal Birth Weight, High Birth Weight indicator variables
Extremely Low Birth Weight is an indicator variable, which takes the value of 1 for
the infants whose birth weight was less than 1,000 grams, and zero otherwise. Very
Low Birth Weight is an indicator variable, which takes the value of 1 for the infants
whose birth weight was less than 1,500 grams, and zero otherwise. Low Birth Weight
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age,12 and whether or not breastfed. Table 1.1 and Table 1.2 provides descriptive
information on first births and all births. Accordingly, 32 percent of women had
C-section in their first birth and 68 percent had vaginal birth in their first birth,
whereas 33 per cent of the all babies were born via C-section and 67 per cent of all
babies were born vaginally.
The first set of outcome variables comes from the birth certificates. I generated Any
Abnormal Conditions to investigate abnormal conditions in infants immediately after
the delivery. Any Abnormal Conditions is an indicator variable, which takes the value
of 1 if any of these occurred immediately after delivery: assisted ventilation required
right after delivery, assisted ventilation required for more than 6 hours, newborn
given surfactant replacement therapy, antibiotics received by the newborn immediately
following delivery, admission to NICU, seizure, and birth injury. I also construct
variables to measure future fertility of the women, such as Total Number of Babies
by Mother, Time Gap Between 1st Baby and 2nd Baby and Does Mother Have More
Than 1 Baby. Total Number of Babies by Mother is the number of babies per mother.
Time Gap Between 1st Baby and 2nd Baby shows the number of months between first
is an indicator variable, which takes the value of 1 for the infants whose birth weight
was less then or equal to 2,500 grams, and zero otherwise. Normal Birth Weight is an
indicator variable, which takes the value of 1 for the infants whose birth weight was
between 2,500 grams and 4,000 grams, and zero otherwise. High Birth Weight is an
indicator variable, which takes the value of 1 for the infants whose birth weight was
greater than or equal to 4,000 grams, and zero otherwise.
12Using gestational age, I construct Premature, Late Preterm, Early Term, Full
Term, Late Term and Post Mature indicator variablesPremature is an indicator variable,
which takes the value of 1 for infants who was born less then 34 completed weeks of
gestation, and zero otherwise. Late Term is an indicator variable, which takes the
value of 1 for infants who was born greater than or equal to 34 completed weeks of
gestation and less than 37 completed weeks of gestation, and zero otherwise. Early
Term is an indicator variable, which takes the value of 1 for infants who was born 37
or 38 completed weeks of gestation, and zero otherwise. Full Term is an indicator
variable, which takes the value of 1 for infants who was born 39 or 40 completed
weeks of gestation, and zero otherwise. Late Term is an indicator variable, which
takes the value of 1 for infants who was born 41 completed weeks of gestation, and
zero otherwise. Post Mature is an indicator variable, which takes the value of 1 for
infants who was born greater than or equal to 42 completed weeks of gestation, and
zero otherwise.
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and second baby. Does Mother Have More Than 1 Baby shows whether or not the
mother had another baby after the first baby. Table 1.3 provides information on the
first set of outcomes derived from birth certificates.
1.4.2 Hospital Inpatient Discharge Data
I obtain inpatient discharge data for mothers and babies separately. For mothers,
the data include encounter level hospitalization records for up to 10 years after their
first birth. For babies, the data include encounter level hospitalization records for up
to 10 years after their birth. Hospital inpatient discharge data are encounter level
and have detailed information on patients’ health outcomes, health utilization, and
health costs. There are major diagnostic categories, procedures, patient discharge
status, charges, admission month/year, and discharge month/year per encounter. I
also have encrypted hospital identifiers in the data.
The second set of outcome variables are related to babies’ and mothers health,
and generated by using primary and secondary diagnoses categories. For instance,
I generated Obesity which is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for the
any of the primary or secondary diagnoses13 show that the patient has diagnosed
by obesity, and zero otherwise. I generated Total Number of Obesity Diagnosis by
summing the number of Obesity diagnoses for each babies’ hospital visits’ diagnoses
categories related to Obesity. I also generated Any Obesity Diagnosis which takes the
value of 1 if a baby ever experienced Obesity, and zero otherwise.
For mothers’ mental health, I generate Are Any of the Mother’s Diagnoses Post-
Partum Depression (1/0)?, Is the Primary Diagnosis Post-Partum Depression (1/0)?,
How Many Total Diagnoses Post-Partum Depression of Any Kind (Primary or Sec-
ondary) does the Mother Have?, and How Many Total Diagnoses Post-Partum Depres-
sion of Any Kind (Primary or Secondary) does the Mother Have?. I also generated
13I used International Classification of Disease (ICD) codes for diagnosis.
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same variables for women’s physical health, measured in complications of the puer-
perium. All the variables constitutes within one year after the first birth. Table
1.4 provides descriptive statistics on mothers’ health conditions.14 Note that distin-
guishing primary and ‘primary and secondary’ diagnosis are important to investigate
the health results more detailed. Principal diagnoses are the conditions that are
mainly responsible for the patient’s admission and indicates the patient condition that
demands the most provider resources during the patient’s stay (Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality 2001). They also play an essential role in how providers are
reimbursed for services rendered (Nicoletti 2014).
For babies, I generate ‘Obesity’, ‘Asthma’, ‘Diseases of the Respiratory System’
and ‘Diseases Related to Immunity Disorders’ in a similar way. Table 1.5 provides
descriptive statistics on babies’ health condition. All ICD codes used are in Appendix
A. Other outcome variables relate to health utilization. I generated Total Number of
Hospital Visits, Total Length of Stay, which is total length of stay in hospitals, and
Total Hospital Charges for both babies and mothers (see Table 1.4 and Table 1.5).
1.4.3 Sample Selection
Although the administrative data provide rich detail on a large sample, they have
some limitations as well. First, the birth certificates do not include date of birth. This
information is restricted to protect individuals’ privacy. Second, the hospital data
for mothers and babies do not include exact admission and discharge dates. These
information are also restricted. Third, the original mothers’ hospital discharge records
do not include babies’ identifiers. All these issues prevent me from merging babies’
hospitalization records on mothers’ hospital records. Therefore, for babies, I am able
14The hospital records for woman does not include babies’ identifiers and exact
birth dates. However, the hospital records were taken from the date they gave their
first birth. Therefore, these outcomes meant to measure the outcomes within one year
after they gave their first birth, and the date of first birth is assumed as the time of
mother’s first admission to the hospital.
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to construct all outcome variables for first births and all births. For example, in Table
1.5, Total Number of Hospital Visits shows that, average number of hospital visits for
first birth babies is 6.10, and average number of hospital visits for all babies (first born,
second born, etc.) it is 5.58. Total Number of Hospital Visits Within 1 Year shows
that average number of hospital visits within one year for the first born babies is 2.11,
and average number of hospital visits within one year for all babies it is it is 2.06.
Table 1.4 shows that for mothers, average number of hospital visits is 9.95. Average
number of hospital visits within one year after the first babies is 1.80. However, the
data prevent me from constructing average number of hospital visits within one year
after any birth, i.e. after 2nd birth, 3rd birth, and so on. Therefore, the variable Total
Number of Hospital Visits Within 1 Year can not be created for ‘All Births’ as it was
generated for babies in Table 1.5. However, the available variables are sufficient to
make essential analysis for both mothers and babies. Last limitation is, I would not
see mother’s or babies’ all hospital records if they leave South Carolina after delivery.
My samples includes mothers who have singleton births; I drop twins (6,781 babies),
triplets (186 babies) and quadruplets (6 babies). I also exclude pre-term births (26,643
babies).15 The final sample for Mothers’ Data has 122,980 mothers (and first babies),
which is 88.3% of the mothers in the original birth certificates sample. In order to
create All Births Data I follow the same process. All Births Data has 244,032 babies,
which is the 87.9% of the babies in the original birth certificates sample.
1.5 Results
This section presents results for first births as the main results. The results for
all births are in the Appendix. The reason for focusing on first births is that the
outcomes for all births could be endogenous to the first births. The regressions for all
births are the same as the regressions for first births, but they additionally control
15The births occurred before 37 gestational weeks.
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for the indicator for having a previous C-section. The results for all births are very
similar to the main results and used as a robustness check.
The results tables include both OLS and 2SLS estimations’ results. Each specifica-
tion; OLS and 2SLS, are presented as including full sets of controls in Model (1) and
Model (2), adding hospital fixed effects in Model (3) and Model (4) and adding both
hospital and birth month-year fixed effects in Model (5) and Model (6), respectively.
OLS estimations treat the cesarean section as exogenous and were constructed as a
benchmark model to compare with IV models.
1.5.1 Abnormal Conditions at Birth
It has been known that, compared to babies born vaginally, babies born by C-
sections are more likely to have health complications, such as having difficulties in
breathing on their own. One explanation is contractions of labor help to prepare
the infants’ lungs for respiration at birth (Stanford Children’s Health 2020). My
results confirm this information. The results on delivery outcomes for babies have
been documented in Table 1.11. These estimates suggest that there is a negative and
significant association between C-sections and conditions immediately after birth for
babies.
Model (1) shows Linear Probability Model (LPM) results when a full set of
covariates is added, Model (3) shows results when hospital effects are also included, and
Model (5) shows results when birth month/year fixed effects are also included. Model
(2), Model (4), and Model (6) show the second stage results for 2SLS estimations with
the same order. Both OLS and 2SLS results show that there is a positive association
between having a C-section and having any abnormal conditions at birth for babies.
According to Model (5), the LPM results show that a C-section increases the likelihood
of having any abnormal conditions by 2.7 percentage point for first births when the
birth month/year and hospital fixed effects are included. Model (6) reports 2SLS
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results. I find that a C-section increases the probability of having abnormal conditions
by 2.6 percentage point for first births. The results for LPM and 2SLS are similar,
suggesting there are not much biases in these estimations from the selection of mothers’
into C-sections. In South Carolina, 6 percent of the babies had abnormal conditions
immediately after birth (Table 1.3), therefore this finding means a 43% increase from
the mean. Table A.2 in the Appendix shows the results for all births, and the results
are similar.
1.5.2 Effects on Women’s Fertility
I investigate the impact on future fertility outcomes and present the results in
Table 1.12 and Table A.3. These estimates suggest a negative and significant impact
on future fertility measured by the total number of babies, a binary measure of the
probability of not having another baby, and the time gap between the first and second
birth (measured in months). These findings confirm previous studies’ findings. Kjerulff
et al. 2020 show that women who delivered their first baby via C-section were also less
likely to have a subsequent live birth compared to women who gave birth vaginally.
Halla et al. 2020 finds similar results and also document that the decline in fertility
due to C-sections translates into a temporary increase in maternal employment.
Panel A in Table 1.12 shows the effects on the total number of babies for first
births. Model (1) shows the OLS results when a full set of covariates are added.
According to Model (1), a C-section generates a 0.135 unit decrease in the number
of total births. It is 0.137 unit decrease when hospital fixed effects are included (see
Model (4)), and is 0.134 when both fixed effects are included (see Model (6)). 2SLS
models show similar results but the magnitudes are smaller. According to Model (2),
a C-section generates a 0.072 unit decrease in the number of total births. It is 0.079
unit decrease when hospital fixed effects are included (see Model (4)), and is 0.081
when both fixed effects are included (see Model (6)). The average number of babies
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per women is 2, therefore, these results mean that the mean number of children in a
family where the first baby was born by C-section would move from 2 to 1.92.
Panel B in Table 1.12 shows the effects on the likelihood of having one more
baby. According to Model (1), a C-section reduces the likelihood of having one more
baby by 2.9 percentage point. Model (5) includes both fixed effects and shows that
the reduction is 2.9 percentage point. Model (2), Model (4), Model (6) show the
2SLS results with all covariates added. According to the 2SLS findings, the effect of
C-sections on the probability of having one more baby is not significant.
Panel C in Table 1.12 shows the effects on the time gap between the first and
second baby. According to Model (1), a C-section reduces 2.38 months the time
between first and second baby, and is 2.4 when birth month/year and hospital fixed
effects are included (Model (5)). According to the 2SLS results, a C-section reduces
2.22 months the time between first and second baby (Model (2)), is reduces 2.23
months when hospital fixed effects are included, and is reduces 2.195 months when
both fixed effects are included (Model (6)). Average time gap between first and second
baby is 44.8 months, therefore this result translates into 5% increase in the time
between babies. A.3 in the Appendix show similar results for fertility outcomes. For
fertility outcomes, both OLS and 2SLS show a reduction in the fertility. However,
the effects of C-sections on fertility are a lot less in 2SLS results comparing to OLS
results, suggesting that the biases in the OLS estimations lead to a higher reduction
in the fertility rates.
1.5.3 Effects on Women’s Health
The results on women’s physical and mental health outcomes are presented in
Table 1.13 and Table 1.14, respectively. The results show that having a C-section
is associated with worse physical health after delivery measured in complications in
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puerperium, however, the findings for mental health points out some positive impacts
on post-partum depression.
Panel A1 in Table 1.13 shows results for probability of having complications of
the puerperim diagnosed by any (primary and secondary) diagnoses. Model (6) is
the preferred 2SLS model which includes both fixed effects. Accordingly, having
a C-section increases the probability of having a complication of the puerperium
by 1.9 percentage point. The mean of probability of having a complication of the
puerperium is 5%, therefore this results mean the percent increase from the mean is
38%. Panel A2 shows results for probability of having complications of the puerperim
diagnosed by primary diagnoses. Accordingly, probability of having a complication of
the puerperium increases by 1 percentage point, if the patient primarily diagnosed
by complication of the puerperium. Panel A3 documents results for total number of
diagnoses complication of the puerperium that a women would have. According to
Model (6), total number of diagnoses complication of the puerperium increases by
0.023 units. The mean of total number of diagnoses complication of the puerperium
is 0.06, therefore this result translates into 38% increase in the number of diagnoses.
Finally, Panel A4 shows results for total number of primary diagnoses complication of
the puerperium. The preferred model shows that total number of primary diagnoses
complication of the puerperium increases by 0.023 units. These findings are important
because postpartum complications can affect women’s long-term health (Sparks 2018).
16 For womens’ physical health outcomes, both OLS and 2SLS show an increase in
the number of times that women experiences complications of the puerperium and
the probability of having a complications of the puerperium. However, the biases in
the OLS estimations shows that the impact of C-sections are larger.
16Women’s physical and mental health outcomes’ results are robust and available
from the author, when the pregnancy risk factors are excluded from the sample.
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Panel A1 in Table 1.14 shows results for probability of having post-partum depres-
sion any (primary and secondary) diagnoses. Panel B3 documents results for total
number of post-partum depression that a women would have. Accordingly, when
both diagnoses categories are considered, C-sections are not linked to a post-partum
diagnoses. However, according to Panel B2, which shows results for probability of
having post-partum depression primary diagnoses, a C-section reduces the probability
of getting postpartum depression by 0.5 percentage point. Given the mean of the
probabiliy of having a postpartum depression is 0.01, this results translates into a
50% increase from the mean. Panel A4, shows the results for total number of primary
diagnosis post-partum depression, and confirms the positive effect on mental health
for the marginal mothers.
These finding is different than (Tonei 2019) who uses self-reported survey data
from English mothers after they give birth. Her findings show that mothers report
having experienced a period of sadness lasting two weeks or more after childbirth.
This paper, however, looks at a postpartum diagnoses , made by doctors for American
mothers. Post-partum depression can be a consequence of many factors, including
pain during delivery (Eisenach et al. 2008), pregnancy and delivery complications,
or having a baby who has been hospitalized (CDC 2020). One explanation for these
results is, C-sections due to breech positions might lead a reduction in these issues
which might help women’s mental health after delivery.
1.5.4 Effects on Babies’ Health Outcomes
Table 1.15 and Table 1.16 (Table A.4 and A.5) show effect of cesarean section on
babies health outcomes measured in obesity diagnosis, immunity-related disorders,
asthma, and respiratory-related diagnosis, for first births. Overall, results show that
C-sections are not associated with babies’ future health outcomes. Model (1), Model
(3), and Model (5) shows the results from OLS estimations; with no fixed effects, with
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hospital fixed effects, and both of the fixed effects, respectively. Model (2), Model
(4), and Model (6) show the results of 2SLS models. Although OLS results lead
to an increase in immunity-related and asthma diagnoses, they are more likely to
be biased from the omitted variables at mom and baby level that would influence
children’s health outcomes. For example, mothers’ behavior might change after having
a c-sections and that would influence babies’ health outcomes.
Panel A1 show whether or not the child has ever diagnosed by obesity for all births
(first births), Panel A2 shows the effect of C-sections on the total number of obesity
diagnosis for first births (all births). All coefficients for both OLS and second-stage
estimations are zero and not statistically significant. Panel B1 and Panel B2 has a
similar structure, but shows the effect on immunity-related disorders. Although the
OLS results show that C-sections are positively associated with immunity-related
disorders, 2SLS estimations do not confirm this. Panel C1 (Panel C2) show the effect
on number of (ever) asthma diagnosis and Panel D1 (Panel D2) shows the effect on
number of (ever) respiratory-related diagnosis. In both cases, OLS estimations show
that C-sections are associated with these diagnoses, but the 2SLS results are not
statistically significant.
1.5.5 Effects on Health Utilization Outcomes
Table 1.17 and Table 1.18 (Table A.6 ) show results for health utilization outcomes
for mothers and first born babies, respectively. Model (1), Model (4), and Model (7)
shows the results from OLS estimations; with no fixed effects, with hospital fixed
effects, and both of the fixed effects, respectively. Model (2), Model (5), and Model
(8) show the outcomes for all hospital visits after the baby is born each baby. Model
(3), Model (6), and Model (9) show the outcome for all hospital visits within 1 year
after the baby is born. The findings show that C-sections increase the total length of
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stay and total charges for both mothers and children. However, C-sections are not
linked to the total number of hospital visits.
For mothers, a C-section increases total length of stay in the hospital within one
year after the first birth by 0.111 units, does not have significant effect on number
of hospitalizations, and is associated with 30 percent increase in the total charges
(see Model 8 and Model 9). For first born babies, the results show that a C-section
increases total length of stay in the hospital within one year after the first birth by
0.236 (0.111) units, does not have significant effect on number of hospitalizations, and
is associated with 23 (28.5) percent increase in the total charges. OLS estimations
and other specifications for the second-stage also confirm these findings.
1.6 Conclusions
This research investigates the implications of C-sections comprehensively. In
order to overcome the endogenous issue of selection into a C-section, I use exogenous
variation from the position of the fetus. In line with medical literature, I document
that having an at term baby in a breech position increases the likelihood of having a
C-section. By using detailed South Carolina administrative data, for the time period
2004 and 2009, I use this variation in the fetus as an instrument for a C-section. The
detailed South Carolina data, which links birth certificates to hospital records, enables
me to examine the impact of C-section on a broader set of outcomes for both mothers
and babies.
I present evidence that an increase in C-sections, among breech births can lead to
significant deterioration in women’s physical health measured in complications in the
puerperium, although women benefit from a C-section at delivery. However, contrary
to previous literature, there is a suggestive evidence that women’s mental health can
be better off after a C-section. Moreover, I show that babies’ future health do not
affect by C-sections, even if they do impact babies’ health at birth. I also find that
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the length of stay at the hospital and hospital charges increase with C-sections, and
there is a negative association with future fertility.
My findings show that, under some circumstances (such as having the baby in an
upwards position), it might be beneficial for women’s mental health to have a C-section
instead of vaginal birth. However, new policies, such as Term Breech Trial, should
consider carefully the physical consequences of these operations. The postpartum
complications can be very severe and life-threatening. Therefore, this paper provides
policy recommendations such that women should have additional doctor controls at
least 1 more year after giving birth.
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Table 1.1 Summary Statistics for Mothers’ and Babies’
Characteristics
First Births All Births
Std. Std.
Mean Dev. Mean Dev.
Fetal Presentation
Breech 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.15
Cephalic 0.93 0.25 0.95 0.22
Other 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.16
Final Route
Cesarean 0.32 0.46 0.33 0.47
Vaginal 0.68 0.46 0.67 0.47
Mothers’ Socio-Economic Char.
Age 23.81 5.66 25.41 5.66
Educ. - Middle School or Less 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.18
Educ. - High School 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.39
Educ. - High School or GED 0.24 0.43 0.25 0.43
Educ. - Some College 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42
Educ. - Associate Degree 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.26
Educ. - Bachelor Degree 0.16 0.36 0.15 0.35
Educ. - Master Degree 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.24
Educ. - PhD 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.11
Ethnicity - Hispanic 0.08 0.28 0.08 0.27
Race - White 0.67 0.47 0.65 0.48
Race - Black 0.31 0.46 0.33 0.47
Race - Other 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.14
Payment - Medicaid 0.50 0.50 0.53 0.50
Payment - Private Insurance 0.39 0.49 0.38 0.48
Payment - Self-Pay 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.22
Payment - Other 0.06 0.24 0.04 0.20
Participated to WIC? (1/0) 0.57 0.50 0.54 0.50
Observations 122,980 244,032
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Table 1.2 Summary Statistics for Mothers’ and Babies’ Characteristics
(continued)
First Births All Births
Std. Std.
Mean Dev. Mean Dev.
Prenatal Care
Kotelchuck Index - Inadequate 0.18 0.38 0.19 0.39
Kotelchuck Index - Intermediate 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.26
Kotelchuck Index - Adequate 0.31 0.46 0.31 0.46
Kotelchuck Index - AdequatePlus 0.42 0.49 0.42 0.49
Mothers’ Health and Risk Factors
Delivery Weight (pounds) 185.15 41.79 187.87 42.93
Pre-Pregnancy Weight (pounds) 154.88 41.96 159.37 43.93
Pre-Pregnancy Diabeter 0.08 0.01 0.08
Pre-Pregnancy Hypertension 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.14
Previous Preterm Birth 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.14
Previous Cesarean 0.00 0.03 0.13 0.34
Gestational Diabetes 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.21
Gestational Hypertension 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.22
Babies’ Cha.
Babies’ Gender - Female 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.50
Breastfeed 0.66 0.47 0.64 0.48
Birth Weight (grams) 3305.78 460.01 3326.68 460.74
Clinically Estimated Gestational Age 39.04 1.10 38.90 1.04
Observations 122,980 244,032
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Table 1.3 Summary Statistics for Delivery and Fertility Outcomes
First Births All Births
Std. Std.
Mean Dev. Mean Dev.
Delivery Outcomes
Any Abnormal Conditions After Delivery (1/0)? 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.22
Fertility Outcomes
Total Number of Babies 2.01 1.00 2.48 1.13
Time Gap Between 1st Baby and 2nd Baby (in months) 44.88 28.32 42.54 27.12
Does Mother Have More Than 1 Baby (1/0)? 0.64 0.48 0.82 0.38
Observations 122,980 244,032
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Are Any of the Mother’s Diagnoses Post-Partum Depression (1/0)? 0.04 0.19
Is the Primary Diagnosis Post-Partum Depression (1/0)? 0.01 0.07
How Many Total Diagnoses Post-Partum Depression of Any Kind
(Primary or Secondary) does the Mother Have? 0.04 0.20
How Many Primary Diagnoses Post-Partum Depression
does the Mother Have? 0.01 0.08
Are Any of the Mother’s Diagnoses Complications of the Puerperium (1/0)? 0.05 0.22
Is the Primary Diagnosis Complications of the Puerperium (1/0)? 0.02 0.15
How Many Total Diagnoses Complications of the Puerperium of Any Kind
(Primary or Secondary) does the Mother Have? 0.06 0.25
How Many Primary Diagnoses Complications of the Puerperium
does the Mother Have? 0.03 0.17
Health Utilization
Total Number of Hospital Visits 1.80 1.74
Log of Total Length of Stay (in days) 1.14 0.55
Log of Total Hospital Charges (in US Dollars) 9.26 0.58
Observations 122,023
Because of the missing values in the outcome variables, observations do not match with sample sizes.
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Table 1.5 Summary Statistics for Babies Health and Hospital Utilization Outcomes within 1 Year After
Delivery
First Births All Births
Std. Std.
Mean Dev. Mean Dev.
Health
Are Any of the Baby’s Diagnoses Obesity (1/0)? 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
How Many Total Diagnoses Obesity does the Baby Have? 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Are Any of the Baby’s Diagnoses Immunity (1/0)? 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.18
How Many Total Diagnoses Immunity does the Baby Have? 0.04 0.24 0.04 0.24
Are Any of the Baby’s Diagnoses Respiratory (1/0)? 0.25 0.43 0.25 0.43
How Many Total Diagnoses Respiratory does the Baby Have? 0.38 0.82 0.38 0.82
Are Any of the Baby’s Diagnoses Asthma (1/0)? 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.08
How Many Total Diagnoses Asthma does the Baby Have? 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.10
Health Utilization
Total Number of Hospital Visits 2.11 1.70 2.06 1.62
Log of Total Length of Stay (in days) 1.10 0.57 1.07 0.58
Log of Total Hospital Charges (in US Dollars) 7.96 0.86 8.11 0.88
Observations 121,733 241,142
Because of the missing values in the outcome variables, observations do not match with sample sizes.
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Table 1.6 How do Control Variables Relate to Breech
Position?
(1) (2)
First Births All Births
Mom Age -0.000 -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001)
Mom’s Educ. - High School -0.001 ) -0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Mom’s Educ. - Some College -0.004 -0.001
(0.003) (0.002)
Mom’s Educ. - Bachelor Degree -0.005 -0.001
(0.004) (0.002)
Ethnicity - Hispanic -0.003* -0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Race - White 0.014*** 0.012***
(0.001) (0.001)
Kotelchuck - Intermediate -0.008*** -0.006***
(0.003) (0.002)
Kotelchuck - Adequate -0.002 -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001)
Mom’s Weight Pre-pregnancy 0.000 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Payment - Medicaid -0.001 -0.005**
(0.003) (0.002)
Payment - Private Insurance 0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.002)
Pre-Pregnancy Diabetes 0.008 0.016**
(0.007) (0.006)
Pre-Pregnancy Hypertension 0.000 0.003
(0.004) (0.003)






Standard errors are robust.
Standard errors are clustered at the hospital level.
LPM estimates. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 1.7 Total Number of Complications Puerperium
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Cesarean Birth 0.016** 0.015** 0.016** 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.023***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 122,023 122,023 122,023 121,257 118,383 118,348 118,346
Controls:
Hospital FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mom’s Demographic Char. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Char. of the Pregnancy Yes Yes Yes
Mom’s Health Risk Factors Yes Yes
Post-Birth Controls Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the hospital level.
2SLS estimations.
Models include birth month/year and hospital fixed effects
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
34
Table 1.8 Validity Test: Predictors of Breech Position
First Births All Births
Coeff. Std. Errors Coeff. Std. Errors
Mothers’ Socio-Economic Char.
Age -0.038*** (0.011) -0.004 (0.015)
Educ. - High School -0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Educ. - Some College -0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Educ. - Bachelor Degree -0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000)
Ethnicity - Hispanic -0.001 (0.004) -0.002 (0.004)
Race - White 0.000*** (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000)
Payment - Medicaid -0.000*** (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000)
Payment - Private Insurance -0.000 (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000)
Participated to WIC? (1/0) -0.010* (0.005) -0.017*** (0.006)
Prenatal Care
Kotelchuck - Intermediate -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.002)
Kotelchuck - Adequate -0.000 (0.000) 0.000** (0.000)
Mothers’ Health and Risk Factors
Mother’s Weight at Delivery 1.401*** (0.247) 0.502 (0.350)
Mother’s Weight Pre-Pregnancy -0.494* (0.000) 0.182 (0.377)
Pre-Pregnancy Diabetes 0.005** (0.002) 0.002 (0.002)
Pre-Pregnancy Hypertension 0.001 (0.003) -0.000 (0.000)
Babies’ Char.
Birth Weight (grams) -41.719*** (5.489) -30.633*** (7.144)
Gestational Age -0.281*** (0.017) -0.391*** (0.022)
Breastfeed 0.004 (0.007) -0.002 (0.007)
Observations 122,980 224,032
All controls are included. OLS estiamtes. p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the hospital level.
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Table 1.9 Mean of the Mothers’ Characteristics by Position of the Fetus
First Births All Births
Breech Cephalic Breech Cephalic
Mothers’ Socio-Economic Char.
Age 26.280 23.670 27.216 25.341
Educ. - High School 0.139 0.207 0.143 0.191
Educ. - Some College 0.213 0.230 0.218 0.235
Educ. - Bachelor Degree 0.212 0.152 0.193 0.144
Educ. - Hispanic 0.079 0.085 0.081 0.082
Race - White 0.814 0.663 0.788 0.645
Payment - Medicaid 0.368 0.504 0.413 0.532
Payment - Private Insurance 0.516 0.378 0.483 0.371
Participated to WIC? (1/0) 0.432 0.573 0.436 0.541
Prenatal Care
Kotelchuck - Intermediate 0.060 0.079 0.057 0.075
Kotelchuck - Adequate 0.305 0.314 0.309 0.316
Mothers’ Health and Risk Factors
Mother’s Weight Pre-Pregnancy 155.659 154.646 161.115 159.222
Pre-Pregnancy Diabetes 0.009 0.006 0.012 0.006
Pre-Pregnancy Hypertension 0.019 0.015 0.025 0.019
Babies’ Char.
Birth Weight (grams) 3247.247 3304.284 3282.142 3326.021
Gestational Age 38.559 39.057 38.545 38.909
Breastfeed 0.714 0.656 0.689 0.634
Observations 3,344 114,936 5,355 231,373
All controls are included. OLS estimates. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the hospital level.
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Table 1.10 First Stage Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
C-section C-section C-section C-section
Panel A: First Births
Breech Position 0.658*** 0.658*** 0.660*** 0.661***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
R-Squared 0.135 0.136 0.146 0.147
Observations 118,093 118,093 118,093 118,093
Panel B: All Births
Breech Position 0.633*** 0.617*** 0.635*** 0.620***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
R-Squared 0.310 0.330 0.317 0.337
Observations 235,182 235,182 235,182 235,182
All Controls YES YES YES YES
Month-Year FE NO YES NO YES
Hospital FE NO NO YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
All controls are included. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the hospital level.
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Table 1.11 Any Abnormal Conditions at Birth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LPM 2SLS LPM 2SLS LPM 2SLS
Cesarean Birth 0.024*** 0.028** 0.027*** 0.026** 0.027*** 0.026**
(0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.012)
R-Squared 0.008 0.008 0.052 0.052 0.054 0.054
Observations 118,093 118,093 118,093 118,093 118,093 118,093
All Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Hospital FE NO NO YES YES YES YES
Month-Year FE NO NO NO NO YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the hospital level.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.0138
Table 1.12 Fertility Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Panel A: Total Number of Babies
Cesarean Birth -0.135*** -0.072*** -0.137*** -0.079*** -0.134*** -0.081***
(0.006) (0.023) (0.006) (0.021) (0.006) (0.020)
R-Squared 0.124 0.123 0.130 0.130 0.136 0.136
Observations 118,093 118,093 118,093 118,093 118,093 118,093
Panel B: Does Mother Have More Than 1 Baby (1/0)?
Cesarean Birth -0.029*** -0.003 -0.030*** -0.007 -0.029*** -0.007
(0.003) (0.014) (0.003) (0.013) (0.003) (0.013)
R-Squared 0.086 0.085 0.092 0.092 0.096 0.095
Observations 118,093 118,093 118,093 118,093 118,093 118,093
Panel C: Time Gap Between First and Second Baby
Cesarean Birth 2.389*** 2.220** 2.382*** 2.223** 2.409*** 2.195**
(0.225) (0.934) (0.211) (0.946) (0.211) (0.957)
R-Squared 0.032 0.032 0.034 0.034 0.036 0.036
Observations 76,016 76,016 76,016 76,016 76,016 76,016
All Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Hospital FE NO NO YES YES YES YES
Month-Year FE NO NO NO NO YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the hospital level.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 1.13 Mothers’ Physical Health within One Year after First Birth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Panel A1: Are Any of the Mother’s Diagnoses
Complications of the Puerperium (1/0)?
Cesarean Birth 0.047*** 0.019*** 0.047*** 0.019*** 0.047*** 0.019***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Panel A2: Is the Mother’s Primary Diagnoses
Complications of the Puerperium (1/0)?
Cesarean Birth 0.021*** 0.009* 0.021*** 0.009** 0.021*** 0.010**
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005)
Panel A3: How Many Total Diagnoses Complications of the Puerperium
of Any Kind (Primary or Secondary) does the Mother Have?
Cesarean Birth 0.054*** 0.023*** 0.053*** 0.023*** 0.054*** 0.023***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007)
Panel A4: How Many Total Primary Diagnoses Complications
of the Puerperium does the Mother Have?
Cesarean Birth 0.024*** 0.010** 0.023*** 0.010** 0.024*** 0.010**
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
Observations 118,346 118,346 118,346 118,346 118,346 118,346
All Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Hospital FE NO NO YES YES YES YES
Month-Year FE NO NO NO NO YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the hospital level.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 1.14 Mothers’ Mental Health within One Year after First Birth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Panel A1: Are Any of the Mother’s Diagnoses
Post-Partum Depression (1/0)?
Cesarean Birth 0.007*** 0.000 0.007*** -0.000 0.007*** -0.000
(0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005)
Panel A2: Is the Mother’s Primary Diagnoses
Post-Partum Depression (1/0)?
Cesarean Birth -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Panel A3: How Many Total Diagnoses Post-Partum Depression
of Any Kind (Primary or Secondary) does the Mother Have?
Cesarean Birth 0.008*** 0.004 0.007*** 0.003 0.007*** 0.003
(0.002) (0.007) (0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006)
Panel A4: How Many Total Primary Post-Partum Depression
does the Mother Have?
Cesarean Birth -0.003*** -0.005** -0.003*** -0.004** -0.003*** -0.005**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 118,346 118,346 118,346 118,346 118,346 118,346
All Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Hospital FE NO NO YES YES YES YES
Month-Year FE NO NO NO NO YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the hospital level.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 1.15 Babies’ Health Outcomes within One Year after Birth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Panel A1: Are Any of the Baby’s Diagnoses Obesity (1/0)?
Cesarean Birth -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Panel A2: How Many Total Diagnoses Obesity?
Cesarean Birth -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Panel B1: Are Any of the Baby’s Diagnoses Immunity (1/0)?
Cesarean Birth 0.004*** -0.000 0.004*** -0.002 0.005*** -0.002
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
Panel B2: How Many Total Diagnoses Immunity Related?
Cesarean Birth 0.004** -0.003 0.004** -0.005 0.004** -0.005
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005)
Observations 118,093 118,093 118,093 118,093 118,093 118,093
All Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Hospital FE NO NO YES YES YES YES
Month-Year FE NO NO NO NO YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the hospital level.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 1.16 Babies’ Health Outcomes within One Year after Birth (cont.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Panel A1: Are Any of the Baby’s Diagnoses Asthma (1/0)?
Cesarean Birth 0.002* -0.000 0.001* -0.001 0.002* -0.001
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Panel A2: How Many Total Diagnoses Asthma?
Cesarean Birth 0.002* -0.003 0.002* -0.003 0.002* -0.003
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005)
Panel B1: Are Any of the Baby’s Diagnoses Respiratory (1/0)?
Cesarean Birth 0.013*** 0.007 0.012*** 0.005 0.013*** 0.005
(0.004) (0.011) (0.003) (0.011) (0.003) (0.011)
Panel B2: How Many Total Diagnoses Respiratory?
Cesarean Birth 0.023*** -0.010 0.022*** -0.014 0.023*** -0.015
(0.007) (0.021) (0.005) (0.021) (0.005) (0.022)
Observations 118,093 118,093 118,093 118,093 118,093 118,093
All Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Hospital FE NO NO YES YES YES YES
Month-Year FE NO NO NO NO YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the hospital level.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 1.17 Mothers’ Health Utilization Outcomes within One Year after First Birth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Panel A: Total Length of Stay
Cesarean Birth 0.292*** 0.112*** 0.294*** 0.110*** 0.293*** 0.111***
(0.009) (0.025) (0.009) (0.022) (0.009) (0.022)
Panel B: Total Number of Visits
Cesarean Birth 0.096*** 0.009 0.096*** 0.007 0.094*** 0.008
(0.010) (0.051) (0.010) (0.036) (0.009) (0.048)
Panel C: Log of Total Hospital Charges
Cesarean Birth 0.519*** 0.281*** 0.513*** 0.297*** 0.507*** 0.301***
(0.021) (0.031) (0.020) (0.026) (0.020) (0.024)
All Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Hospital FE NO NO YES YES YES YES
Month-Year FE NO NO NO NO YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the hospital level.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 1.18 Babies’ Health Utilization Outcomes within One Year after Birth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Panel A: Total Length of Stay
Cesarean Birth 0.279*** 0.242*** 0.282*** 0.236*** 0.281*** 0.236***
(0.011) (0.022) (0.011) (0.021) (0.011) (0.021)
Panel B: Total Number of Visits
Cesarean Birth 0.064*** 0.020 0.060*** 0.007 0.061*** 0.006
(0.015) (0.035) (0.012) (0.036) (0.011) (0.036)
Panel C: Log of Total Hospital Charges
Cesarean Birth 0.267*** 0.233*** 0.273*** 0.226*** 0.266*** 0.229***
(0.018) (0.042) (0.016) (0.038) (0.016) (0.036)
All Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Hospital FE NO NO YES YES YES YES
Month-Year FE NO NO NO NO YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the hospital level.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Note: The data is obtained from the South Carolina Department of Health and
Environmental Control Vital Records and all-payer, uniform billing data for inpatient
discharges from the South Carolina Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Office. Figures show
the percent of babies by delivery type over years.




Note: The data is obtained from the South Carolina Department of Health and
Environmental Control Vital Records and all-payer, uniform billing data for inpatient
discharges from the South Carolina Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Office. Figures show
the percent of babies by delivery type over years.
Figure 1.2: Average Total Hospital Charges (in US Dollars) within 1 Month after
First Births by Delivery Type
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(a) First Births (N = 122,980)
(b) All Births (N = 244,032)
Note: The data is obtained from the South Carolina Department of Health and
Environmental Control Vital Records and all-payer, uniform billing data for inpatient
discharges from the South Carolina Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Office. Figures show
the percent of babies delivered by C-section vs. naturally if they were in the breech
position or in cephalic position, i.e. ideal position (head-down) for childbirth. First
births are presented in Figure 1.3a, all births are presented in Figure 1.3b.
Figure 1.3: Percent of Births by Position of the Fetus and Delivery Type
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Chapter 2
Which Entry Fee: That Is the Question 1
2.1 Introduction
A contest is a game where participants exert effort to increase their probability of
winning one or more prizes. There are many contests in real life which have an entry
fee such as writing contests, music competitions, photography contests, marathons,
dance competitions, and cooking competitions. The contest literature does not give
much attention to contests with entry fees although most real-life contests have them.
Moreover, contest organizers realized a long time ago that the entry fee can increase
the revenue.
In this paper we experimentally investigate contests with entry fees. Based on the
model of Fu, Jiao, and Lu 2015, we design an experiment to investigate how subjects’
behavior and the expected total spending change with different entry fees. We consider
the simplest, two - player within – subject setting, where each subject has 120 tokens
(in all five treatments) and makes entry and contribution decisions for five different
entry fees, and the prize value is always V = 100 tokens. Our experimental design
provides a sharp predicted difference among the five entry fees: the theory predicts
two active players in pure-strategy equilibria for low entry fees c = 10 and c = 25;
mixed-strategy equilibria for medium entry fees c = 40 and c = 70; and no active
players in the equilibrium for high entry fee c = 110. In addition, the theory predicts
that the contest organizer’s expected payoff or expected total equilibrium spending is
1Zehra Valencia with Alexander Matros.
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maximized at the optimal entry fee c = 25. It is not feasible to test the optimal entry
fee with randomized control trials, but we can test this prediction experimentally in
this paper.
First, we find that theoretical equilibrium point predictions do not work for both
individual participation and contributions in an experimental laboratory for all entry
fees. However, the comparative statics work quite well: as the theory predicts, if the
entry fee increases, then both individual participation and contributions decrease.
Second, we find that subjects spend more than the equilibrium predictions for
all entry fees. This finding is consistent with experimental literature, in which most
studies show significant overspending in experiments regarding theoretical predictions
in contests. See, for example, Morgan, Orzen, and Sefton 2012, Fallucchi, Renner, and
Sefton 2013, Sheremeta 2013, Lim, Matros, and Turocy 2014, Dechenaux, Kovenock,
and Sheremeta 2015, and Sheremeta 2018.
Third, we discover under- and over- participation for low and high entry fees. On
the one hand, we find that around 3% of subjects never gamble, which explains under-
participation for low entry fees when the theory predicts full participation. On the
other hand, around 13% of subjects always gamble, which explains over-participation
for high entry fees, even if the entry fee (c = 110) is higher than the prize value,
V = 100.
Finally, over-participation for high entry fees means that the designer’s revenue
is higher than the theoretical prediction. Indeed, we notice that medium entry fee
c = 70 maximizes total spending in the experiment, which is different from the
theoretical prediction of the low entry fee c = 25. This result is based on two effects:
over-participation and overspending for medium entry fee c = 70. This result shows
that the contest designer can increase his expected payoff by means of medium entry
fees in the experiment.
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We also investigated the gender differences. We find that female subjects participate
more often and bid more aggressively than male subjects. However, this observation
is not statistically significant.
Anderson and Stafford 2003, Boosey, Brookins, and Ryvkin 2020, and Hammond
et al. 2019 study experimentally contests with entry fees. Anderson and Stafford
2003 test theoretical predictions of Gradstein 1995 using an experimental design with
a variable number of players, cost heterogeneity, and a fixed entry fee. In the first
stage, players decide whether to enter the contest and pay a fixed entry fee or not to
enter. In the second stage, the contestants compete in a Tullock contest. The authors
find that, consistent with theoretical predictions, cost heterogeneity and an entry fee
decrease participation and effort. Our paper differs from Anderson and Stafford 2003
in two ways. First, our subjects have to make decisions about their participation
and contribution at the same time. Second, and more importantly, we examine how
subjects’ behavior changes with different entry fees.
Boosey, Brookins, and Ryvkin 2020 experimentally test the effect of disclosing the
number of active participants in contests with endogenous entry. At the first stage,
participants choose between entering the contest or receiving an outside option. At
the second stage, active participants choose their investment level. In the experiment,
the authors manipulate the size of the outside option and the disclosure of the number
of entrants at the second stage. They find more entries for lower outside options, as
theory predicts. When the outside option is low, consistent with the theory, disclosing
the number of entrants has no effect on aggregate investment. However, if the outside
option is high, they find that there is a strong positive correlation between aggregate
investment and disclosure of the number of active players. Our paper is similar to
Boosey, Brookins, and Ryvkin 2020, when they do not disclose the number of entrants.
However, we differ in how we model entry fees: Boosey, Brookins, and Ryvkin 2020
have the outside option, and we explicitly use entry fees. This important difference
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can significantly affect the experimental results due to the different framing of entry
fees. This effect has been known since Kahneman and Tversky 1979. In addition, we
are able to find the entry fee that maximizes total spending or the contest designer
revenue. Anderson and Stafford 2003 and Boosey, Brookins, and Ryvkin 2020 do not
consider this question.
Hammond et al. 2019 investigate contests with prize-augmenting entry fees both
theoretically and experimentally. Moreover, their model incorporates different abilities
of the players (which are their private information) and entry fees increase the winner’s
prize. They also investigate their theoretical predictions for a two-player case in the
experimental laboratory. They set entry fees either at zero, the optimal level (the
level that maximizes total effort in theory), or higher than the optimal level (three
times the optimal level). They find, consistent with their theoretical predictions, that
the optimal entry fee maximizes the revenue. In contrast, our optimal entry fee in
the experiment is higher than the theoretical prediction. However, Hammond et al.
2019 setting is different from our model and experiment because their winner prize
depends on the entry fee.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, we present a theoretical
model in Section 2.2. A unique equilibrium is described in which we show how entry
fees affect the level of participation and individual efforts in the contest, as well as
the expected payoff of the contest designer. Then, in Section 2.3, we describe our
experimental design and predictions. Section 2.4 presents our main findings. Section
2.5 concludes.
2.2 Model and Predictions
This section is based on the model of Fu, Jiao, and Lu 2015. We consider only the
two-player case, which is tested in our experiment. Suppose that both players 1 and 2
value the prize as V = 100, and there is a contest entry fee c ≥ 0.
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A strategy of each player i has two parts (pi, xi), where 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1 is the contest
entry probability of player i and xi ≥ 0 is her contest contribution. If player i enters
the contest, or pi = 1, then she maximizes her expected payoff:
Eπi (xi) = −c+ (1− pj) · 100 + pj
xi
x1 + x2
· 100− xi, (2.1)
where i 6= j, the first term is the entry fee, the second term is the expected payoff
from winning the prize without competition, the third term is the expected payoff
from winning the prize with competition, and the last term is the cost of effort.2
A symmetric equilibrium, (p∗, x∗), is described in the following proposition and
illustrated in Figures 2.1a and 2.2a.
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3 (100−c), if 25<c<V =100,
0, if c≥V =100.
The theory gives a unique symmetric equilibrium prediction for each entry fee,
c ≥ 0. In particular, if the entry fee is low, or 0 ≤ c ≤ 25, then both players enter the
contest for sure, p∗ = 1, and exert the same effort, x∗ = 25. Note that the equilibrium
effort is the same for all low entry fees. If the entry fee is medium, or 25 < c < 100,
then the unique symmetric equilibrium is in mixed strategies: each player enters
the contest with probability p∗ = 100−c75 , and exerts the same effort x
∗ = 13 (100− c).
Finally, if the entry fee is high, or above the prize value, c ≥ V = 100, then in the
equilibrium both participants do not enter the contest, or p∗ = 0.
2We assume that xi
x1+x2 =
1
2 , if x1 = x2 = 0.
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The expected total equilibrium spending, or the expected payoff of the contest
designer is:
Eu (c) = (p∗)2 × (2x∗ + 2c) + 2p∗(1− p∗)× (x∗ + c) + (1− p∗)2 × 0, (2.2)
where the first term is the expected payoff when both players enter the contest, the
second term shows the expected payoff when exactly one player enters, and the last
term gives the expected payoff when nobody enters the contest. Simplifying (2.2), we
get
Eu (c) = 2p∗(x∗ + c). (2.3)
Therefore, using (2.3) and Proposition 2.2, we get the following result.




2(1004 + c), if 0 ≤ c ≤ 25,
8
300 (100− c) (
1
3 (100− c) + c), if 25 < c < V = 100,
0, if c ≥ V = 100.
The expected total equilibrium spending is maximized at c∗ = 25.
The contest literature usually evaluates total equilibrium spending because the
contest designer typically wants to maximize it. We will also focus on the expected
total spending, or the expected payoff of the designer.3 Proposition 2.2 claims that
total equilibrium spending is not monotonic in c. Moreover, total equilibrium spending
is single-peaked in the entry fee, c; and entry fee c∗ = 25 maximizes the expected total
equilibrium spending. Figure 2.3a illustrates the designer’s expected payoff.
3We consider the expected total spending instead of net spending, because the
prize often cannot be taken (back) by the contest designer.
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2.3 Experimental Design
We have designed a two-player experiment to test some of the comparative statics
predictions developed in the previous section. Our treatment variable is the entry fee,
c > 0. We fixed the prize value at V = 100 and varied the entry fee to check how
the level of participation and individual efforts in the contest, as well as the expected
payoff of a designer, change. The theory gives a unique equilibrium prediction for
each entry fee, see Propositions 2.2 and 2.2. We consider two low entry fees, c = 10
and c = 25, two medium entry fees, c = 40 and c = 70, and a high entry fee, c = 110.
Table 2.2 summarizes theoretical predictions for these five cases. Our experimental
design provides a sharp predicted difference among the five entry fees: two active
players in pure-strategy equilibria for the low entry fees; mixed-strategy equilibria for
medium entry fees; and no active players in the equilibrium for the high entry fee.
Additionally, the theory predicts that entry fee c = 25 maximizes the expected total
equilibrium spending.
We conducted three experimental sessions for a total of 69 subjects in the Moore
School of Business at the University of South Carolina.4 In our experiment, two
subjects with endowments of e = 120 tokens competed for the prize of V = 100 tokens.
In each session, subjects were asked to make their choices of entry and contribution
decisions for five different entry fees. Those entry fees were c = 10, c = 25, c = 40,
c = 70, and c = 110 tokens. The exchange rate was 10 tokens = 1 dollar.
To test one-shot theoretical predictions, the game was repeated only two times in
each session. The only information obtained by the subjects after the first round was
the decision of a random pair for a particular entry fee. This entry fee was also chosen
4The number of subjects in each session was 25, 30, and 14, respectively. Also note
that we initially had 93 subjects. However, 8 subjects did not answer some questions,
and we excluded them from our observations. We also excluded 16 subjects who made
at least 1 illegal bid, i.e. the sum of his/her bids and cost level was exceeding the
endowments.
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at random. Our approach is similar to Anderson and Stafford 2003, who conduct a
one-shot game experiment.
Subjects were undergraduate students participating in our experiment for the first
and only time. Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics.5 No subject participated
in more than one experimental session. Subject interactions and decision-making
were anonymous and were conducted with a pen and paper in large auditoriums
at the University of South Carolina. Prior to the first round of play, subjects were
given written instructions that were also read aloud in an effort to induce common
knowledge of endowments, the prize, and the mechanism for winning the prize. After
the instructions were read, but before the experiment, each subject had to answer
four questions on a quiz about the experimental game. The quiz and instructions are
given in the Appendix.
Each student received a 5-dollar Starbucks gift card for participation.6 In addition,
one pair of students was chosen at random to play for cash at the end of the session.
The round and the entry fee, which determined their earnings, were selected throwing
dice. Our payment scheme is what Charness, Gneezy, and Halladay 2016 called "pay
only to a subset of individuals." They argue that this approach is "more effective" than
"pay-all" scheme.
2.4 Experimental Findings
We present our findings in this section. First, bids are discussed. We found that
average bids are (much) higher than the equilibrium bids. Secondly, we report average
participation probabilities, which are different from the equilibrium probabilities.
5Among the 69 students, 4 of them did not complete the questionnaire. Therefore,
we do not have information on their age, gender, race/ethnicity, education level and
self risk assessment.
6This payment method was quick (we completed all experimental sessions in 50
minutes) and convenient, because Starbucks is the only coffee shop inside the business
school.
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Thirdly, the expected designer payoffs are discussed. We found no statistically
significant difference among sessions and pooled all of them together. Finally, we
discuss the differences in the participation and bidding behavior of female and male
subjects. See Table 2.2 for a summary of our observations.
2.4.1 Bids
Figure 2.1a presents average bids and equilibrium predictions across treatments.
Average bids are significantly higher than equilibrium predictions for each entry fee.
This finding is consistent with the overspending in contest experiments for zero entry
fees. See, for example, Sheremeta 2013. Figure 2.1b shows the difference between
average bids and equilibrium predictions for each treatment in each round. This
difference increases from the first round to the second in all sessions.
We find that several subjects use "natural" decision rules. In particular, 5 partic-
ipants (7%) in the first round and 6 subjects (9%) in the second round always bid
the same amount in all treatments. We also find that 5 participants (7%) in the first
round and 7 subjects (10%) in the second round always spend the same amount (entry
fee plus bid) in all treatments.
In order to compare how different entry fees affect subjects’ bids, we estimate an
OLS regression model for the bidding decision, with entry fee dummies7 and a vector
of subject-level controls which include age, education level, race and ethnicity, number
of correct answers in quizzes and subjects’ self risk assessment.8 We find that the
theoretical comparative statics results hold in the experiment: higher entry fees lead
to lower average bids.
Table 2.3 reports results for estimated models. Model (1) is our base model without
controls. Based on results of model (1), the average bid is 40.82 tokens when the
7Our reference entry fee is 10.
8This is a categorical variable that varies from 0 (not at all willing to take risks)
to 10 (very willing to take risks). See also Dohmen et al. 2011.
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entry fee is 10 tokens (base group), which is significantly higher than the equilibrium
prediction of 25 tokens. In addition, the average bid in the base group is significantly
higher than average bids for all other entry fees. In particular, average bids are about
6.1; 10.4; 17.3; and 35 tokens lower for entry fees 25; 40; 70; and 110.9 Models (2),
(3), and (4) include demographic controls, number of correct answers in quizzes, and
risk attitudes. Our findings are robust to these specifications. In summary,
Result 1
(i) Overspending: Average bids are significantly higher than theoretical predic-
tions for all entry fees.
(ii) Comparative statics: Higher entry fees result in significantly lower average
bids.
We also investigate gender differences. We observe that, subject to participation
in the contest, females bid more aggressively in all rounds, see Table 2.5 and Figure
2.4. Our findings are similar to Morgan, Orzen, and Sefton 2012 and Hammond et al.
2019, who also find that females make worse expenditure decisions in contests.
2.4.2 Participation Probabilities
Figure 2.2a presents average participation probabilities and the equilibrium pre-
dictions. Figure 2.2b shows the differences between participation probabilities and
equilibrium predictions for each treatment in each round. We find significant under-
participation when the entry fees are low (10 and 25) and significant over-participation
when the entry fees are high (70 and 110).10 How can these observations be explained?
9Mean bids are lower when entry fee is 40 than entry fee is 25 (p = 0.0048, the
Wald test), it is lower when entry fee is 70 than entry fee is 40 (p = 0.0000), and it
is lower when entry fee is 110 than entry fee is 70 (p = 0.0000). All other pairwise
comparisons are available upon request.
10All differences are significant at 1 percent level.
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It might be the case that each subject believes that other subjects would enter the
contest when the entry fee is low, and would not enter when the entry fee is high.
It turns out that 3 subjects (4.3%) in the first round and 5 subjects (7.3%) in the
second round never enter the contest (or never gamble) for any entry fee, which
explains the under-participation for low entry fees. At the same time, 12 subjects
(17.4%) in the first round and 20 subjects (29.9%) in the second round always enter
the contest (or always gamble) for any entry fee, which explains the over-participation
for high entry fees. These results demonstrate that point predictions do not hold for
participation probabilities. However, the theoretical comparative statics results hold
in the experiment: higher entry fees lead to lower participation probabilities.
Table 2.4 show the estimated marginal effects of a Probit regression model for
the participation decision. Model (1) is our base model without controls, model (2)
controls for demographics (age, education level, race and ethnicity), model (3) controls
for the number of correct answers, and model (4) controls for self risk assessments.
Our findings are robust to these specifications. As illustrated by Figure 2.2a, we find a
significant negative effect on the probability of participation when entry fee increases
from 10 to other entry fee values.11 In summary,
Result 2
(i) Under- and Over- participation: There is significant under-participation for
low entry fees and significant over-participation for high entry fees.
(ii) Comparative statics: Higher entry fees result in significantly lower participa-
tion probabilities.
11Mean entry probabilities are lower when entry fee is 40 than entry fee is 25
(p = 0.0001, the Wald test), it is lower when entry fee is 70 than entry fee is 40
(p = 0.0000), and it is lower when entry fee is 110 than entry fee is 70 (p = 0.0000).
All other pairwise comparisons are available upon request.
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We investigated gender differences in participation probabilities as well. Our
results are not statistically significant, but we have suggestive evidence that females
participate more often than males, no matter what the entry fee is. See Table 2.5 and
Figure 2.5.
2.4.3 Expected Total Spending
Which entry fee maximizes total spending? The theory predicts that higher
entry fees (in an equilibrium) lead to lower participation and lower bids. It is not
obvious which effect is stronger: more money in advance (higher entry fee) and less
money later (lower participation and bids), or less money in advance (lower entry
fee) and more money later (higher participation and bids). However, Proposition 2.2
specifies the entry fee that maximizes the expected designer payoff. This entry fee
is c = 25 in theory. Figure 2.3a shows the experimental and theoretical expected
total spending. Note that the expected total spending is significantly higher than the
theoretical prediction in all cases, except for the optimal entry fee, c = 25. We find
that the entry fee of 70 tokens maximizes the designer’s expected payoff, which is
different from the theoretical prediction. This result is based on two effects: over-
participation (see Result 2) and overspending (see Result 1) for the medium entry fee
c = 70. Figure 2.3b presents the difference between the expected designer’s payoffs
and theoretical predictions for each entry fee in every round. This difference increases
as we move from the optimal entry fee c = 25 to the high entry fee c = 110. We also
find over-dissipation when entry fees are equal to or greater than c = 25, or when the
expected total spending exceeds the value of the prize. This is a surprising observation
for two-player contests. Usually, at least four players are necessary in order to observe
over-dissipation in an experimental laboratory in a contest without entry fees. See
Lim, Matros, and Turocy 2014. Our result demonstrates that the contest designer
can increase his expected payoff by means of medium or high entry fees.
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Result 3
(i) The expected payoff of the designer in the experiment coincides with the theo-
retical prediction if the entry fee maximizes his theoretical expected payoff or
c = 25. For all other entry fees, the expected total spending is significantly
higher than theoretical predictions.
(ii) The entry fee of c = 40 maximizes the designer’s expected payoff.
(iii) There is over-dissipation for entry fees equal to or greater than c = 25.
2.5 Conclusion
Many contests do not have entry fees. However, more and more contest organizers
introduce entry fees in their competitions in order to increase profits. A typical
example is Eyelands Short Story Contests. They did not have an entry fee before
2016. Now, they charge a 10 euros fee for participation.12
In this paper, contests with entry fees are analyzed. We find that the contest
designer can increase the expected payoff in the experiment by increasing the theoret-
ically optimal entry fee. This experimental finding is due to over-participation and
over-bidding for medium entry fees. Future research is needed to characterize optimal
entry fees in experiments. This will be important for all contest organizers.
12See this example at https://eyelandsawards.com/
61
Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics
All Sections Section 1 Section 2 Section 3
Variable Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Dev. Dev. Dev. Dev.
Age 19.52 1.18 19.74 1.07 19.43 1.15 19.36 1.35
Dohmen Risk 6.18 1.81 6.3 1.73 6.14 1.83 6.07 1.91
Female 0.37 0.48 0.43 0.5 0.32 0.47 0.36 0.48
African-American 0.08 0.27 0.13 0.34 0.07 0.26 0 0
Asian 0.18 0.39 0.13 0.34 0.21 0.41 0.21 0.41
White 0.74 0.44 0.74 0.44 0.71 0.45 0.79 0.41
Freshman 0.45 0.5 0.3 0.46 0.54 0.5 0.5 0.5
Junior 0.23 0.42 0.39 0.49 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35
Senior 0.02 0.12 0 0 0 0 0.07 0.26
Sophomore 0.31 0.46 0.3 0.46 0.32 0.47 0.29 0.45
# of Correct Answers 2.72 0.87 2.76 0.91 2.7 0.82 2.71 0.88
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Table 2.2 Average Bids and Participation Probabilities
Bids N.E. Bids Participation N.E. Participation Designer’s N.E. Designer’s
Probabilities Probabilities Expected Payoff Expected Payoff
All
c=10 40.82 25 0.9 1 92.31 70
c =25 34.69 25 0.75 1 97.76 100
c =40 30.42 20 0.73 0.8 108.32 96
c = 70 23.55 10 0.54 0.4 111.51 64
c = 110 5.79 0 0.38 0 106.72 0
Round 1
c=10 34.63 25 0.93 1 80.26 70
c =25 31.16 25 0.71 1 83.39 100
c =40 25.31 20 0.7 0.8 95.65 96
c = 70 22.9 10 0.45 0.4 93.18 64
c = 110 5.96 0 0.35 0 87.72 0
Round 2
c=10 47.43 25 0.87 1 104.35 70
c =25 37.84 25 0.8 1 112.14 100
c =40 35.04 20 0.77 0.8 120.99 96
c = 70 24.02 10 0.62 0.4 129.84 64
c = 110 5.64 0 0.41 0 125.72 0
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Table 2.3 The Effect of Costs on Bids
(1) (2) (3) (4)
c = 25 -6.130** -5.493** -5.411** -5.578**
(2.351) (2.372) (2.358) (2.340)
c = 40 -10.407*** -10.594*** -10.504*** -10.638***
(3.073) (3.247) (3.255) (3.233)
c = 70 -17.269*** -18.452*** -18.576*** -18.783***
(3.604) (3.719) (3.719) (3.780)
c = 110 -35.034*** -32.782*** -32.988*** -33.331***
(3.962) (4.497) (4.412) (4.612)
Constant 40.823 111.551 115.764 107.926
(4.032) (80.230) (80.332) (86.531)
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes
Correct Answers No No Yes Yes
Self Risk No No No Yes
R-Squared 0.123 0.167 0.170 0.171
Observations 455 418 418 418
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the student level.
OLS regression results.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 2.4 The Effect of Costs on Participation Probabilities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
c = 25 -0.210*** -0.217*** 0.217*** 0.216***
(0.047) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
c = 40 -0.233*** -0.259*** -0.259*** -0.261***
(0.052) (0.054) (0.053) (0.054)
c = 70 -0.468*** -0.469*** -0.474***
(0.061) (0.063) (0.064) (0.064)
c = 110 -0.566*** -0.629 *** -0.630*** -0.637***
(0.072) (0.077) (0.076) (0.078)
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes
Correct Answers No No Yes Yes
Self Risk No No No Yes
Observations 690 650 650 650
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the student level.
Probit regression results.
Columns report marginal effects of a Probit regression model.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 2.5 Average Bids and Participation Probabilities by Gender
ALL Round 1 Round 2
Female Male Female Male Female Male
Entry Fee c=10
Bids 44.07 38.12 35.65 34.49 53.29 41.86
N.E. Bids 25 25 25 25 25 25
Participation Prob. 0.92 0.89 0.96 0.9 0.88 0.88
N.E. Participation Prob. 1 1 1 1 1 1
Entry Fee c=25
Bids 35.5 34.93 28.74 34.41 41.62 35.39
N.E. Bids 25 25 25 25 25 25
Participation Prob. 0.83 0.71 0.79 0.66 0.88 0.76
N.E. Participation Prob. 1 1 1 1 1 1
Entry Fee c=40
Bids 28.88 30.89 21.84 29.6 35.24 32.04
N.E. Bids 20 20 20 20 20 20
Participation Prob. 0.83 0.65 0.79 0.61 0.88 0.68
N.E. Participation Prob. 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
Entry Fee c=70
Bids 20.73 25.1 19 26.47 21.81 24.09
N.E. Bids 10 10 10 10 10 10
Participation Prob. 0.54 0.49 0.42 0.41 0.67 0.56
N.E. Participation Prob. 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Entry Fee c=110
Bids 7.1 5.58 8.13 5.25 6.42 5.92
N.E. Bids 0 0 0 0 0 0
Participation Prob. 0.42 0.29 0.33 0.29 0.5 0.29
N.E. Participation Prob. 0 0 0 0 0 0
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(a) All Rounds - Bids
(b) Difference Between Data and Predictions
Figure 2.1: Average Bids
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(a) All Rounds - Participation Probabilities
(b) Difference Between Data and Predictions
Figure 2.2: Average Participation Probabilities
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(a) All Rounds
(b) Difference Between Data and Predictions










Figure 2.5: Gender Differences in Average Participation Probabilities
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Supplementary Tables Chapter 1
Table A.1 ICD codes (WHOs International Classification System for Diseases)
Diagnosis / Procedures ICD-9 ICD-10
Planned Cesarean Birth O7582 64981 - 64982
Obesity 278 E65-E68
Postpartum Depression 648.44 F53
Complication of the Puerperium 670-677 O85-O92
Asthma 493 J45-J46
Atopic Dermatitis and Related Cond. 691 L20, J30.1-J30.4
J30.8, J30.9
Diseases of the Respiratory System 460–519 J00–J99
Endocrine, Nutritional and
Metabolic Diseases, and Immunity Disorders 240-279 E00-E89
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Table A.2 Any Abnormal Conditions at Birth - All Births
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LPM 2SLS LPM 2SLS LPM 2SLS
Cesarean Birth 0.031*** 0.058*** 0.033*** 0.056*** 0.030*** 0.054***
(0.007) (0.016) (0.007) (0.015) (0.006) (0.015)
R-Squared 0.008 0.006 0.033 0.031 0.036 0.034
Observations 235,182 235,182 235,182 235,182 235,182 235,182
All Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Hospital FE NO NO YES YES YES YES
Month-Year FE NO NO NO NO YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the hospital level.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.3 Fertility Outcomes - All Births
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Panel A: Total Number of Babies
Cesarean Birth -0.444*** -0.346*** -0.437*** -0.350*** -0.301*** -0.232***
(0.013) (0.025) (0.013) (0.023) (0.010) (0.021)
R-Squared 0.133 0.132 0.141 0.140 0.220 0.219
Observations 235,182 235,182 235,182 235,182 235,182 235,182
Panel B: Does Mother Have More Than 1 Baby (1/0)?
Cesarean Birth -0.119*** -0.104*** -0.117*** -0.105*** -0.073*** -0.065***
(0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.003) (0.009)
R-Squared 0.089 0.088 0.094 0.094 0.166 0.166
Observations 235,182 235,182 235,182 235,182 235,182 235,182
Panel C: Time Gap Between First and Second Baby
Cesarean Birth 2.924*** 4.050*** 2.968*** 4.035*** 4.610*** 4.539***
(0.226) (0.574) (0.232) (0.559) (0.209) (0.647)
R-Squared 0.050 0.050 0.053 0.053 0.134 0.134
Observations 193,105 193,105 193,105 193,105 193,105 193,105
All Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Hospital FE NO NO YES YES YES YES
Month-Year FE NO NO NO NO YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the hospital level.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.4 Babies’ Health Outcomes within One Year after Birth - All Births
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Panel A1: Are Any of the Baby’s Diagnoses Obesity (1/0)?
Cesarean Birth -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Panel A2: How Many Total Diagnoses Obesity?
Cesarean Birth -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Panel B1: Are Any of the Baby’s Diagnoses Immunity (1/0)?
Cesarean Birth 0.006*** 0.005 0.006*** 0.004 0.005*** 0.003
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004)
Panel B2: How Many Total Diagnoses Immunity Related?
Cesarean Birth 0.006*** 0.003 0.007*** 0.001 0.006*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
Observations 118,093 118,093 118,093 118,093 118,093 118,093
All Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Hospital FE NO NO YES YES YES YES
Month-Year FE NO NO NO NO YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the hospital level.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.5 Babies’ Health Outcomes within One Year after Birth - All Births
(cont.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Panel A1: Are Any of the Baby’s Diagnoses Asthma (1/0)?
Cesarean Birth 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Panel A2: How Many Total Diagnoses Asthma?
Cesarean Birth 0.000 -0.003 0.000 -0.003 -0.000 -0.004
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
Panel B1: Are Any of the Baby’s Diagnoses Respiratory (1/0)?
Cesarean Birth 0.007*** 0.001 0.009*** -0.003 0.013*** -0.000
(0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.010)
Panel B2: How Many Total Diagnoses Respiratory?
Cesarean Birth 0.014*** -0.006 0.018*** -0.012 0.024*** -0.009
(0.004) (0.019) (0.004) (0.019) (0.004) (0.020)
Observations 118,093 118,093 118,093 118,093 118,093 118,093
All Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Hospital FE NO NO YES YES YES YES
Month-Year FE NO NO NO NO YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the hospital level.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.6 Babies’ Health Utilization Outcomes within One Year after Birth - All
Births
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Panel A: Total Length of Stay
Cesarean Birth 0.291*** 0.288*** 0.298*** 0.280*** 0.295*** 0.277***
(0.010) (0.022) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010) (0.020)
Panel B: Total Number of Visits
Cesarean Birth 0.069*** 0.040 0.076*** 0.022 0.082*** 0.022
(0.010) (0.035) (0.010) (0.033) (0.010) (0.033)
Panel C: Log of Total Hospital Charges
Cesarean Birth 0.198*** 0.224*** 0.203*** 0.219*** 0.277*** 0.286***
(0.018) (0.040) (0.017) (0.036) (0.016) (0.035)
All Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Hospital FE NO NO YES YES YES YES
Month-Year FE NO NO NO NO YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the hospital level.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Appendix B
Experimental Instructions Chapter 2
Quiz
QUESTION 1:
In the end of each round, I will randomly choose 2 students and reveal their
decision information. Imagine that both students choose “Participate”. Student I
buys 60 lottery tickets and student II buys 40 lottery tickets. What is the probability
that student II (who bought 40 lottery tickets) will win the lottery?
My answer: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
QUESTION 2:
In the end of each round, I will randomly choose 2 students and reveal their
decision information. Imagine that student I chooses “Participate” and buys zero
lottery tickets; and student II chooses “NOT Participate”. Suppose that the Entry
Fee is 10 tokens. Who will win the lottery?
My answer: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
QUESTION 3:
In the end of each round, I will randomly choose 2 students and reveal their
decision information. Imagine that student I chooses “Participate” and buys zero
lottery tickets; and student II chooses “NOT Participate”. Suppose that the Entry
Fee is 10 tokens. What is the payoff of student II ?
My answer: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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QUESTION 4:
In the end of each round, I will randomly choose 2 students and reveal their
decision information. Imagine that student I chooses “Participate” and buys zero
lottery tickets; and student II chooses “NOT Participate”. Suppose that the Entry
Fee is 10 tokens. What is the payoff of student I?
My answer: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Experimental Instructions1
Welcome! This is an experiment in strategic decision making. You get a $5 gift
card from Starbucks for participating!
In addition, you can earn money for decisions you make in the experiment! Please
do NOT communicate with other people during the experiment. If you have a question,
please raise your hand so that I can answer you in private.
Steps in the experiment are as follows:
Step 1: Before starting the experiment, you will be asked to fill out a short
questionnaire.
Step 2: Before the experiment, you will have a quiz that will NOT affect your
grade.
Step 3: Experiment.
The experimental currency - tokens. The exchange rate is 1 token = 10 cents.
This means that 10 tokens = 1 dollar, 100 tokens = 10 dollars.
The experiment consists of a sequence of two identical rounds.
You make your choice on different papers each round. At the end of first round, I
will randomly select two students (a pair) and reveal their choices.
1Please see here for complete experimental instructions.
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Endowment
You will begin each round with an endowment of 120 tokens. You can use any
number of tokens from 0 and 120 to buy lottery tickets in this round. Details will be
explained below.
Structure of a round
In each round all students will be randomly paired and each one of you will
choose one of the two options: Option A: “Participate” and Option B: “NOT
Participate”.
IF YOU CHOSE TO PARTICIPATE. . .
What is the Probability that You Will Win the Lottery?
After all students decide on the number of lottery tickets, the outcome of each
lottery will be determined. Remember, there are only 2 participants in each lottery.
The probability that you win the lottery is:
Number of your lottery tickets
Number of your lottery tickets + Number of your opponent′s lottery tickets
Notes:
• If both of you are active and if you both buy zero lottery tickets, then each of
you will win the lottery prize with same probability, which is 50%.
• If you are the only active player in your pair, you will be the winner, even if
you have bought zero lottery tickets.
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Example 1:
Suppose that you and your opponent are both active. If you buy 10 lottery tickets
and your opponent buys 90 lottery tickets, then the probability that you win the
lottery is:
10
10 + 90 =
10
100 = 0.1 = 10%
In other words, 10 out of 100 times you win the lottery.
Example 2:
Suppose that you and your opponent are both active. If you buy 70 lottery tickets
and your opponent buys 30 lottery tickets, then the probability that you win the
lottery is:
70
70 + 30 =
70
100 = 0.7 = 70%
In other words, 70 out of 100 times you win the lottery.
Example 3:
Suppose you are active but and your opponent is not active. If you buy 80 lottery
tickets, then the probability that you win the lottery is:
80
80 = 1 = 100%
In other words, in this case, you will win the lottery!
Please note that even if you bought zero lottery tickets, you still win the
lottery!
Feedback at the end of each round
You will play two identical rounds.
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In each round, you will be faced with five different Entry Fees. You will have
to decide whether you want to NOT Participate/ Participate and, in the latter
case, the number of your lottery tickets to buy for each Entry Fee.
At the end of first round, I will collect decisions of all students and randomly
choose two of them.
I will announce and write the following information on the board:
• I will write the entry decisions and the number of lottery tickets (for those who
entered) for the chosen students in the experiment. I will not share their names.
• I will randomly choose one Entry Fee. It can be 10 tokens, 25 tokens, 40
tokens, 70 tokens or 110 tokens.
• The entry decisions made by each student: PARTICIPATE or NOT PARTICI-
PATE.
• The number of lottery tickets bought by the “ACTIVE” participant(s).
How will your earnings be determined?
You will participate in two identical rounds. At the end of the last round, I will
randomly choose one round out of two.
The pair selected for this round will be paid in cash for their decisions.
All students will receive $5 gift cards from Starbucks for participating!
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STEP 1: QUESTIONNAIRE




o I prefer not to response.





o I prefer not to response.
4. What is your classification in college?







5. How do you see yourself? Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to
take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?
Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 0 means “not at all willing
to take risks”and the value 10 means “very willing to take risks”.
6. Please write your name and e-mail, if you want to be contacted about experi-
ments.
I want to participate in economics experiments.
My name is: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
My e-mail is: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7. Your id number is: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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